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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
Respondent, 
vs. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
vVESTERN RAILROAD COM-
p AN"Y, a corporation, 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Case No. 
8505 
A. PRELIMINARY STATE~IENT 
The parties will be referred to as in the Court below. 
All italics are ours. 
Defendant's brief contains .a State1nent of Facts 
which is neither complete nor in many respeets accurate. 
We, therefore, deen1 it necessary to restate the facts of 
the case. 
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B. THEFACTS 
Plaintiff Robert L. Heywood was 63 years of age at 
the time of trial. He had spent the mature years of his 
life as a machinist having first hired out for the Southern 
Pacific Company in the year 1911. He had worked as a 
machinist for defendant frmn N ovmnber :2, 1922 to the 
date of his injury on November 23, 1953. His work con-
sisted of running machines, .assen1bling machines, engines 
and parts and umchining parts ( R. 1-!). During the 
nwnth of Novernber, 1953, his particular assignment was 
that of a general handy n1an under the supervision of 
diesel foreman, Paul Schenk. 
On the uwrning of the oceurrence Heywood was as-
:-;igned by Schenk to take up a steam leak on a single arch 
steam hammer located at the blacksmith shop (R. 16, 59). 
A single arch stemn hannner is a rnechanisrn whose 
purpose is the fashioning of large pieces of rnetal into 
various sizes and shapes. The ~temn con1es frmn the 
power hou.se which is located approxilnately one block 
fron1 the blacksmith shop. The pressure .at which the 
stemn is n~nall~· kept i8 :2:'>0 pounds. Boiler pops are 
located on the boiler whieh relieYe the pressure if it 
reaches a higher amount (R. 19, :20). During Xove1nher 
of 1953, the pressure maintained on the stearn lines in 
the blacksrnith shop \Ya~ kept at varying anwunts. How-
P,Ver, the minirnurn anwunt observed on the dials by the 
plaintiff \\'a~ :200 pounds (H. :21 ). The ~tean1leak ~elwnk 
had assigned IIPy\\'ood to repair on the 1norning of 
~O\'Pml>Pr :2:~, 1 D:l:~, \\'<1~ in tlw stuffing box. The stuffing 
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box i~ located approxinmtel~- ten to hYelve feet from 
the ground '"here tit<' ~team pipe come~ from tlw 
steam line and goes into the stuffing box. A shn1-
off valve is located approximate!~, two feet from 
the stuffing box out along the steaJn line (R. 21). The 
purpose of the stuffing box is to provide a flexible joint 
so that the vibration of the hammer will not break the 
pipe at the threads. On the end of the pipe which goes 
into the stuffing box is a collar. The pipe is placed inside 
the box. Sever.al rings of packing are placed in the box 
around the pipe and against the collar and the gland is 
then tightened by four nuts, leaving approximately one-
half inch of packing between the collar and the gland (R. 
22). If a leak develops it c.an frequently be corrected by 
simply tightening the gland. Sometimes it is necessary 
to replace smne of the packing. If the packing is soft, 
generally one ring is replaced. If it is hard it may be 
necessary to replace rnore than one ring (R. 25, 26). On 
the occasion in question when plaintiff approached the 
stuffing box he observed that steam was leaking frmn the 
box and the gland was down tight. He knew he would 
have to place n10re packing in the box. He placed a 
ladder against the single arch hammer in the a pproxi-
mate position shown on Exhibit 2, clirnbed the ladder and 
turned off the vain" near the stuffing box (R. 49, 50, 54, 
;)5). After he had turned off the valve, he took the gland 
off the box, slid it hack along the pipe and took out one 
ring of packing. He needed 16-inch packing. Schenk gavp 
him .a piece of seven inch square packing and he advised 
Hchenk that thi~ wa~ not the right :;:ize. EvE>ntufll1;.T he 
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found a proper size of packing at the power house, took 
it back and put it in the stuffing box around the pipe (R. 
'27 -29). Plaintiff testified that he performed this task in 
the usual and normal ·way. He replaced the gland and 
tightened it to what he thought was the proper tension. 
He then reached up and opened the valve. At the time he 
opened the valve, he was on the ladder with his feet ap-
proximately six feet off the ground. He testified, "A. 
Well, I turned the valve, and I hadn't come down one step 
before the steam pipe blew straight out in my face, and 
as it came out it hit me on the hand here." (R. 30). He 
fell from the ladder and landed on the floor in a standing 
position with his weight on the left leg (R. 30). In order 
for the pipe to have come out of the gland, it would have 
been necessary for it to break away fron1 the collar (R. 
67 -68). 
Defense witness J a1nes Everett A_berton, Division 
Locmnotive Fore1nan, arrived shortly after the accident 
and observed the pipe that had blo"\\"'11 loose from the 
joint. In his opinion, the pipe at the collar had been 
broken prior to the tune it gave way except for about 
three-eighths of an inch which apparently had given way 
suddenly when the pipe can1e out of the stuffing box ( R. 
136-1~~8). 
Crowton, a pipefitter \Yith ~i7 year~ of experience 
who testified for plaintiff, stated that the pipe involved 
ap]wared to be ~ingle ~trength. If it had once been doublr 
strength, the ~team cutting away at the interior had 
thinned out the pipe until it had the appearance of single 
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strength (R. 114). lie observed the break in the pipe 
near the collar and testified that the fresh bre.ak as dis-
tinguished from the older break was approximately five-
eighths of an inch in length (R. 111). See also Aberton's 
testimony at record 146. 
There is a distinction between the work of a machin-
ist and a pipefitter. A pipefitter does all work on pipes 
including re1nov.al and repair. A machinist works on 
machines or mechanisms but not on pipes. The foreman, 
in this instance Schenk, determines whether the machinist 
or the pipefitter is to do the ViTork. If Schenk had desirerl 
to have the pipe inspected on thif' occasion he would have 
had Heywood get the mechanism ready for removal of tlw 
pipe and .a pipefitter renwve the pipe (R. 15, 79, 85, 98). 
That the foregoing facts were not in dispute is seen from 
the testimony of Aberton. He stated: 
"Q. The job of renwving the packing and replac-
ing the packing, is the job of a machinist, such 
as Mr. Heywood was 1 
A. To remove the packing1 
Q. Yes; and replace it 1 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. But if the pipe has to be removed, the fore-
man instructf; the pipefitter to remove it, 
doesn't he"! 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the foreman determines whether the pipe 
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A. Yes sir." (R. 145). 
Urowton testified to the same effect ( R. 109). 
Heywood testified that if an inspection were to be 
1nade of the interior of the steam box and the condition 
of the collar and pipe within the steam box, this would 
be a matter for the supervisor to detern1ine and not for 
hin1 (R. !)7, 69, 79, 85). 
Schenk testified that the rea8on he went and looked 
at the 1nachine after being notified of the leak was so 
that he could detennine whether to send a 1nachinist or 
a pipefitter to repair the leak. He testified: 
"'Q. Why did you go to look it over and see what 
was the 1natter with it~ 
. \. So I could notify the u1an about going out 
and 1naking repairs. 
ll. That u·as so you could determiue whether or 
not to send a pipefitter o11f, or just a machin-
ist, isn't that right? 
A. In a way, yes. 
Q. And you detennined, at that ti1ne, the fellow 
that ~hould go out slionld be a 1nachinist -~ 
~\. Correct. 
Q. You didn't have in n1ind any pipes would have 
to be re1noved, did you-~ 
A. No. 
<l. \'on concluded, frmn looking at it, that all it 
needed wa8 that packing put in there? 
.\. That is right (H. 1:l:).15±). 
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He further testified that he made no arrangeinents 
at any time to shut the stemn off the line at the inter-
mediate valve (R. 154.) 
Heywood testified that only two things could cause 
a leak, either the need for new packing, or a broken pipe 
(R. 45). 
Aberton was in cmnplete aceord on this proposition 
(R. 138, 146). 
Plaintiff testified that in removing and replaeing the 
packing in the stuffing box, he would not have an oppor-
tunity to see the end of the pipe with the collar on it or 
have determined the condition of the collar. An inspec-
tion could not be 1nade without re1noving the pipe frmn 
the stuffing box. 
He further testified that one of the reasons he 
couldn't see in the stuffing box or make an inspeetion as 
to the condition of things in the stuffing box w.as the 
steam. He stated that the condition of the valves gener-
ally in the shop and of this valve in particular, was such 
that there was always a certain amount of steam escaping 
even though the valve was shut off as tightly as was pos-
sible. The result was that when he was working at the 
stuffing box some steam was coming out of the box (R. 
::32, 59, 64). 
Aberton also testified that the joint in the stuffing 
box was concealed and could not have been inspected 
without opening the box and getting into it (R. 138, 146). 
------_~-~"?.'~-------------
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Schenk rnade an inspection of the leak at the hammer 
before he assigned Heywood to repair the leak. He is the 
one who had the responsibility of determining whether to 
remove and inspect the pipe. He decided against this pro-
cedure (R. 151). 
:B~urthernwre, Schenk wa:S at the hmmuer at the time 
the work by plaintiff was under way when he brought 
plaintiff the seven-eighths-inch square packing which 
plaintiff could not use. Plaintiff testified: 
"Q. Did he ever tell you to take the piping out .at 
that time~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did he ever tell you to inspect that flange~ 
A. No, sir." (R. 79) 
Plaintiff had worked rnany year8 in and around the 
blacksmith shop under the supervision of various fore-
rnen. He had always used the valve next to the stuffing 
box on this particular n1achine and he didn't know of the 
existence of the so-called intennediate valYe in the middle 
of the blacksrnith shop (R. 51, 75, 76). 
Griffith on the other hand testified that the so-called 
interrnediate valve in the center of the shop was the usual 
and custmnary place where stemn was turned off when 
the hamrner ·was going to be shut down for the type of 
repair being done by Heywood at the tin1e of his injury. 
He also h'~ti l'it>d that turning off the stemn is a pipe-
fitters work and that it wa~ n~nal for a pipefitter to turn 
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the stean1 off when work similar to that being done by 
Heywood was done (R. 93, 98). 
Alberton also testified it ""as the practice and custom 
to turn off the intermediate valve when repairs were 
made on the stuffing box (R. 138). 
Schenk tt>stified concerning practice and custom 
(R. 150): 
"A. I notify the machinist to make the repair, and 
then the practice is, when the machinist goes 
out there, when he is free to go out there and 
do the job, he notifies me about it, and I get 
a pipe fitter to prepare the work. We have an 
intermediate valve which is shut off-neces-
sary to shut this off, so the man can work with 
security on the job. This is considered a pipe-
fitter's job, and we-I instntct the pipefitter 
to shut that valve off. 
Q. You are referring to the interinediate valve~ 
A. The intennediate valve. That is not the valve 
at the stemn hammer." 
It will be recalled that Schenk inspected the leak at 
the hammer on the morning of the accident, instructed 
plaintiff as to his work, and was later at the hammer 
when plaintiff was seeking the right size of packing. At 
no time did he request a pipefitter or anyone else to turn 
off the intermediate valve (R. 28, 59, 151, 154). 
Crowton testified that if work w.as being done on the 
single arch hammer, the shut off valve which was used 
by the plaintiff was the one generally used. He stated 
that the shut-off valve in the middle of the blacksmith 
shop would be used if there was some leak or defect be-
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tween that valve and the valve near the hammer. If some 
repair had to be made at that hammer or beyond the 
valve near the hammer, the valve near the hmnmer would 
be the one used (R. 106). 
Crowton testified that the piping and fittings, with 
the exception of some pipes which had been broken or 
worn out and replaced, had been in the blacksmith shop 
since 1923 or 1924, and that the railroad had no practice 
of inspecting the fittings or the piping to determine 
whether any should be renewed (R. 100). 
He testified that pipes which have steam pressure in 
them deteriorate from the inside, making them thinner 
but there is little, if any, deterioration from the outside. 
With respect to joints that are threaded, he testified that 
if a collar is 1nachined rather than threaded on the pipe 
the area will not be as weak and will not be as likely to 
give way. The collar on the pipe in this case was threaded 
rather than machined and the break oceurred in the first 
thread. In his experience this was always the place where 
pipe would give way first. He further stated that with 
the passage of time in the blaeks1nith shop, leaks in the 
piping had becmne rnore and nwre frequent (R. 101, 102). 
Plaintiff testified that the pressure in these steam 
lines wa.s always too high. On occasions prior to his in-
jury, he had co1nplained about the mnount of pressure in 
the lines to Schenk and Alwrton (R. 3:2). H,, nmde the~,, 
cmnplaints ahnost every tin1e he was sent to repair stea1n 
leaks in the blacks1nith shop (R. 32). 
Smneti1ne prior to plaintiff's injuries, there had 
been reducing valves on the stemn lines into the black-
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smith shop. These reducing valves had either become in-
operative or had been rPmoved. Crowton testified that tlw 
reducing valves would have kept the pressure down below· 
a certain maximum and would have prevented excess 
pressure (R. 105). 
Plaintiff testified that a pressure of 135 pounds was 
adequate for operation of the 1nachines in the blacksmith 
shop. The 200 pound minimum pressure maintained in 
the blacksmith shop was unnecessary and the reducing or 
regulating valves would have corrected the excess pres-
sure (R. 38). 
Crowton also testified that pipes in the blacks1nith 
shop are old and that there was always danger of pipe 
blowing up (R. 33). He further testified that there was 
a type of shut-off valve consisting of a wheel .and chain 
reaching to the floor which could have been used on this 
particular line and which would have prevented the neces-
sity of getting up on the ladder near the, stuffing box in 
order to turn the valve, and that this type of valve would 
have been safer because a workman wouldn't have been 
required to get up near the steam pressure in order to 
turn the valve off and on ( R. 34). 
STATI1Jl\lENT OF POINT~ 
POINT I 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 IS A ·CORRECT STATEMENT OF 
THE LAW AND IS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANT. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS SUBMISSION OF IN-
STRUCTION NO. 7 TO THE JURY. 
l,fW:i:-
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POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS SUBMISSION OF IN-
STRUCTION NO. 8 TO THE JURY. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR BY REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S RE-
QUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NO. 1, 8 AND 11. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL ·COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR BY REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S RE-
QUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 6. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL ·COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR BY REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S RE-
QUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 2. 
POINT VII 
THE ISSUES OF NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE WERE FOR THE JURY: THE TRIAL COURT 
CORRECTLY AND JUSTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
POINT I 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 IS A ·CORRECT STATE-:\IENT OF 
THE LAW AND IS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANT . 
. \naly~i~ of Instruction Xo. 6 clear!~· reveals that 
it is not, a~ C'ontenderl hy defendant, a mandator~- in8truC'-
tion. 
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At the outset the jtu~, is advised that defendant 
is liable only for a failure to exercise reasonable care 
to provide its employees with a re,asonably safe place 
to; work. The jury is further advised that this does 
not require the absolute elimination of all danger, but 
only those dangert-> which the exercise of reasonable 
care would remove or guard against. Applying those 
general principles to the case, the court ins,tructs the 
jury that it they find from a preponderance of the evi-
dence that plaintiff at the time of his injury was per-
forming the duties of his entplyoment and that defendant 
failed to exercise reasonable care to make said place 
reasonably safe for the performance of such duties, 
liability would attach. By use of the words "in that" 
objected to by defendant an added limitation is imposed. 
The jury is told that said unsafety must be confined to 
the position of the plaintiff in connection with his duties 
and the oper.ation of appliances used in the performance 
of his duties, and further that his position and the 
operation of the appliances "were such that the plaintiff 
was not performing his duties in a place of reasonable 
safety." It is difficult for us to im-agine an instruction 
more confining .and nwre limited in its terms. Our posi-
tion is that said instruction was unduly and unneces-
sarily favorable to the defendant because it did not 
allow the jury to consider all surrounding circumstanres 
in determining whether plaintiff's place of work was 
reasonably s.afe. For example, the amount of steam 
pressure in the liner-; and the general deterioration of 
the piping in the round house were removed frmn tlt<· 
-- --.~ :~m_ ------------• 
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jury's consideration by the overrestrictive language of 
the instruction. Also removed from the jury's consider-
ation was the conduct of foreman Schenk in not requiring 
that the pipe be removed and inspected before having 
plaintiff replace the packing. The jury should have 
been allowed to consider fore1nan Schenk's conduct in 
detennining whether defendant had exercised reasonable 
care in furnishing plaintiff a reasonably safe place in 
which to work. In Denny r. lJf ontmtr R. C!J. (Penn. 
t951) 101 F. Supp 735, the court stated: 
"The rule which requires the railroad to 
furnish its employees with a reasonably safe 
place to work does not have reference only to 
the physical condition of the place itself but also 
has reference to the negligent acts of the fellow 
employees. Bailey v. Central Vennont Ry. Inc., 
319 U.S. 350, 63 S. Ct. 1062, 87 L. Ed. 1-!4-± ~ 
Griswold v. Gardner, 7 Cir., 155 F. 2d 333." 
However, defendant is in no position to con1plain 
about .an instruction that i1uposed on plaintiff as the 
prevailing party, a greater burden than the law required. 
See Drew u. St. Lou is-Sa11 Francisco Ry. Co. (:Missouri 
1927) 293 s.w. -!63. 
Defendant .in its brief at pagt> 16, ~tates: 
'"This eharge plaees the whole e1uphasis on 
whether the place of work 'Yas safe, rather than 
whether defendant failed to exercise reasonable 
care." 
rl,hat such i~ not the faet ean best be detenuined 
by reference to tla~ nu1nber of oe{'asions in the instruc-
tion where the trial c.ourt n~e~ the words negligence, 
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reasonable care, reasonably safe place to work .and 
reasonable safety. It i~ also significant that the jury is 
only told that they may find defendant negligent, not 
that they m'Ltst find negligence. In .addition, the interpre-
tation of said instruction n1ust be considered in the 
light of the other instru0tions given. In this connection 
we call attention to the staternent of Mr. Justice Holmes 
in lTnion Pacific R.R. Co. r. Hadley, 246 LT.S. 330, 332, 
:~.~ S. Ct. 318, 319, 6~ L. Ed. 751 : 
"On the question of its negligence, the de-
fendant undertook to split up the charge into 
items mentioned in the dedaration as constituent 
elements and to ask a ruling as to e.ach. But the 
whole may be greater than the sum of its parts, 
and the court was justified in leaving the general 
question to the jury if it thought that the defend-
ant should not be allowed to take the bundle 
apart and break the sticks separately, and if the 
defendants' conduet viewed as a whole warranted 
a finding of neglect." 
Throughout the instructions are found constant refer-
ences to the requirement of a finding of negligence 
before liability will attaeh. Jnstruction No. 1 in part 
reads as follows : 
"He specifically alleges that the defendant 
was negligent in failing to use reasonable care 
to furnish plaintiff .a re~asonable safe place to 
work in that he was directed to repair a steam 
leak from such a position and in such a proximit.\~ 
to the stean1 controls, that he was unable to safely 
perfonn the duties of his employn1ent ; .. 
---cor•~-·ll!la....,--,. ------------· 
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Instruction No. 2 in stating the general principles 
of law governing the c.ase, quotes from the Federal 
Employers' Lia;bility Act as follows: 
"**** shall be liable in damages to any per-
son suffering injury ***** resulting in whole or 
,in part from the negligence of any of the em-
ployees of such carrier." 
Instruction ~o. 3 defines negligence and ordinary 
ear e. 
Instruction ~ o. 5 states that an employer is liable 
for negligent acts or omissions of an einployee. 
Instruction No. 11, reads as follows: 
"You are instructed that the railroad is not 
required to keep its shops equipped with new 
and modern equipment and that the mere fact 
that equipment may be old and used is not in 
and of itself sufficient evidence to prove negli-
gence on the p.art of the defendant railroad.'' 
Instruction No. 12 advises the jury how to appor-
tion any recovery for the respective negligence of plain-
tiff and defendant. Instruction X o. 13, the dmnage in-
struction, also uses the words "a~ a proxilnate result 
of defendant's negligence .. , 
It is difficult to eonceive how a trial court could 
devise nwre way8 and 1neans of reiterating that liabilitv 
will only attach upon a finding of defendant's failure 
to exercise ordinary care. 
The CJases cited hy defendant are distinguishable. 
In Seaboard Airline 1-lailway r. Horton. ~3:~ 1T.S. -t9~. 
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34 Sup. Ct. 638, 585 L. Ed. 1062, (1914), the trial court 
gave a clearly mandatory instruction. A mere recital 
of the instruction condemned in that case should demon-
strate the distinction between said instruction and the 
one given in the case at bar. 
"*** If you further find from the evidence 
that the guard was a proper safety provision for 
the use of that guage and that it was unsafe with-
out it, then the defendant did not furnish him a 
safe place and s.afe appliance to do his work, 
and if it remained in that condition, it was con-
tinuing negligence.****" 
In Instruction No. 6 the jury is told: 
"If you ... find ... that ... defendant failed 
to exercise reasonable care to make said place 
reasonably safe ... you may find the defendant 
negligent ... " 
The sarne mandatory provisions of the I-Iorton cm~t' 
appear in the next case cited by defendant. Atlantic 
Coastline Railroad ComJmny v. Dixon 189 F. 2d 525, 
(Cert. den. 342 U.S. 830, 72 Sup. Ct. 54, 96 L. Ed. 628). 
The jury was instructed as a matter of law that if 
the place of work was unsafe, defendant was liable. 
Reasonable care and negligence were foreign to tlw 
instruction given. In Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. r. 
Burks, 196 Ark. 1104, 121 S.W. 2d 65, the jury \Va~ 
instructed as a matter of law that if the floor of the 
freight car w.as unsafe, defendants were negligent. Lia-
bility of the defendant was not made contingent on a 
showing of negligence. In Stevens v. Mirakian, 177 Ya. 
123, 12 S.E. 2d 780, it was held that the jury should 
-------- ~-~-~· -----------· 
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have been instructed that defendant knew or in the 
exercise of ordinary care should have kno"\Vll of the 
defective condition of the chair before defendant could 
be found negligent. This was not a xnaster-servant case 
and the basis of liability was not failure to exercise 
ordinary care to furnish a reasonably safe place to work. 
Likewise it was not a case in which the evidence was 
undisputed as to the nature and extent of knowledge 
possessed by defendant as is the case here. 
It will be observed that Instruction Xo. 6 uses the 
words "reasonable safety." The word reasonable is 
variously defined as ''exercising sound judgment" or 
sensibly restrained or te1nperate." Thus it can be seen 
that the degree of safety rec1uired by the instruction is 
not absolute but qualified by reasonableness, and limited 
to the exercise of ordinary ~are on the part of defendant. 
In 8. 8. Kresge Co. u. JlrCallion, (Eighth Circuit. 
193.2) 58 F. 2d 931, the Court stated: 
'' [t is not difficult to destroy ahnost any 
eharge by isolating certain limited expressionf; 
therein, but the charge n1ust be c.onsidered as a 
whole with the view of detennining the nnpres-
sion conveyed thereby to the jury. TFe cannot 
think the jury could hare listened to this rhar.rJ<'. 
1rhich again and again spoke of negligence and of 
care, and therefrom hare gotten an impressiou 
that negligence was no pa'rt of the issue, and that 
no Inatter how careful appellant might have been 
it was liable." 
In Schirra r. J)elaware L. ~ JF. R. Co., (Penn. 195~) 
103 F. Supp R1 ~' the ('Onrt upheld instructions similar 
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to those given in the case at bar. See also Glidewell r. 
Quincy, 0. & K. C. R. Co., (Mo. 1921) 236 S.W. 677. 
Defendant eon1plains that Instruction No. 6 is er-
roneous because it fail~ to specifically require the jury 
to find that defendant rail road emnpany knew or should 
have known of a condition which exposed plaintiff to an 
unreasonable risk of harm. Our answer to this claim j ~ 
two-fold. First the requirentent that the jury rnust find 
defendant railroad cmnpany failed to exercise reasonable 
care to furnish plaintiff with a reasonably safe place 
in which to work, incorporates within it by necessan~ 
inference, the proposition that the railroad company 
knew, or should have known of a condition which sub-
jected plaintiff to .an unreasonable risk of harrn. It if: 
obvious that under the general instruction defining negli-
gence the jury could not have found that defendant failed 
to do what an ordinary person would have done lill{kr 
the circumstances unless they also found that defendant 
had knowledge of a condition subjecting its employees 
to an unreasonable risk of harrn. Secondly, under the 
facts of the case, knowledge on the part of defendant 
cmnpany was not a disputed issue. The defendant com-
pany conceded that the break in the pipe was old and 
consequently diseoverable hy an inspection consisting 
of removal of the pipe fron1 the stuffing box. 
At page 8 of defendant's brief appears the following 
statement: 
"1\fr. Aberton found that there was an old 
break between the collar and the pipe all the way 
around the pipe except for approximately :;~' 
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(Record 37) He was able to determine that the 
break was old because of discoloration (Record 
156). He stated that it was his opinion that there 
was just a thread holding the pipe to the collar 
at the time Mr. Heywood was performing hi::; 
work (Record 137, 138)." 
Counsel then quotes at page 9 from the testimony 
of witness Crowton to the same effect. Likewise, it was 
undisputed that said break could not have been dis-
covered without removing the pipe from the stuffing 
box. We again quote from page 14 of defendant's brief: 
"The break in the pipe was one which could 
not have been detected without ren1oving thP 
pipe." 
Furthermore, it was undisputed that only two things 
could have caused the leak in the stuffing box, either 
a break in the pipe within the stuffing box, or loo:-;p 
packing. If it was a break in the pipe, it would be a 
job for the pipefitter to perfonn. If it was loose packing, 
it would be a job for the n1achinist. It was fore1nan 
Schenk's responsihilit~· to detennine whether a 1nachinist 
or a pipefitter should perfonn the work. He decided 
to have Heywood, the nmehinist, replace the packing, 
and the effect of this decision \Yas that the pipe w-as not 
re1noved frmn the stuffing hox and was not inspected. 
Defendant's hopeless effort to place responsibility for 
the decision not to renwn' the pipe on the shoulders 
of :Heywood i~ contnu~· to the undisputed testimony 
0 r defendant's own witne~se~. i-\berton testified: 
"Q. And the foreman detern1ines whether thP 
pipe is to be removed does he not in the first 
instance~ 
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~\. Yes, sir," (R. 145). 
And Schenk, the foreman, testified: 
·•Q. That was so you could determine whether or 
not to send a pipefitter out, or just a 
machinist, isn't that right? 
A. In a way, yes." (R. 153). 
And again: 
"Q. You concluded, from looking at it, that all 
it needed was that packing put in there? 
A. That is right." (R. 154). 
rrhe facts being undisputed, the only question for 
the jury was whether in view of the undisputed facts, 
defendant failed to exercise reasonable c.are to furnish 
plaintiff with a reasonably safe place in which to work. 
That issue vvas properly submitted to the jury by the 
trial eourt's instructions. 
An analysis of a serie;-; of Missouri cases demon-
sh·.ates the soundness of plaintiff's position: 
In J1 essin.fJ v. Judge & Dolph Dntg Company, 322 
~Io. 901, 18 S.W. 2d 408, (1929), the court discussed 
an instruction similar to Instruction No. 6 and st,ated: 
"The most serious complaint urged by appel-
lant against the instruction is that it fails to re-
quire the jury to find that the defendant knew, 
or by the exercise of ordinary care could have 
known, of the unsafe condition of plaintiff's place 
of work. The instruction, however, requires the 
jury to find, as a necessary prerequisite to a 
~erdict in favor of plaintiff, that 'in thus furn-
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ishing and providing said place of work, **** tlw 
defendant failed to use ordinary care and was 
guilty of negligence.' It has been repeatedly and 
consistently ruled by this court that a finding of 
negligence imports knowledge (on the part of 
the party found to have been negligent) of the 
unsafe condition of the appliance, or of the place 
of work. An allegation, or a finding, that a defend-
ant negligently caused or permitted an unsafe 
described condition is equivalent to an allegation, 
or a finding, that a defendant knew the condition 
to exist. The reason for the foregoing uniform 
holding is readily apparent, for it is obvious that 
the jury could not well have found that the de-
fendant was negligent in furnishing the plaintiff 
with an unsafe place in which to work without 
believing (and inferentially finding) that defend-
ant knew, or by the exercise of ordinary care 
could have known, of the unsafe condition of 
the place of work." 
The :Messing case was follmn•d in a nu1nber of later 
Missouri cases. In J(mner r. Ill issouri-I\ ansas-Te:ra~ R. 
Co. 326 :Mo. 79~. 3:2 S.,Y. 2d 107;) (1930). the rourt 
stated: 
"The instruction does not, in express words, 
require a finding that defendant knew or in the 
exercise of ordinarY care eould haYe known that 
plaintiff was betwe.en cars: but. we do not think 
it must be held erroneous on that account. The 
finding that defendant under the circmnstance~ 
was not in the exercise of ordinary care, and wa~ 
guilty of negligence, is equivalent to a finding 
that defendant knew or in the exercise of ordinarY 
care could have known plaintiff wa~ between th~ 
ears. (Citing eases).·· 
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The :Messing case and the J{ame r ea~P were upheld 
in Perry v. Missouri-Kansas-Tel'as R. Co. (:Missouri 
1937) 104 S.W. 2d 332. 
The Supre1ne Court of :Missouri had occasion to 
elaborate upon the doctrine of the ~Iessing case in 
8chonlau v. Tenninal R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 357 Mo. 
1108, 212 S.W. 2d 420 (1948). In that case a baggage 
handler ''Tas injured allegedly because of a bmnpy condi-
tion of a sub-basement floor. The trial court in its 
instruetions did not require a specific finding that the 
railroad cmnpany knew, or should have known, of the con-
dition of the floor, but submitted the case on general 
instructions pertaining to negligence. Defense counsel 
urged the appellate court to reappraise and reconsider 
the doctrine pronounced in the :Messing ,case. The court 
~tated: 
"Defendant urges that we should re-examine 
that doctrine. Perhaps, if the circumstances of 
this case were otherwise, it would be well to do 
so, and, in the future, to limit its applic:ation only 
to those instances, in which we are satisfied the 
jury, in making all the findings required by an 
instruction in order to reach the requested verdict, 
could not do so unless it also found defendant had 
sufficient knowledge of the unsafe condition com-
plained of. 
However, in the instant case we are s:atisfied 
from the requirements contained in plaintiff's 
instruction that the jury had to find, inferentially 
at least, that defendant had sufficient knowledge 
of the unsafe condition. The instruction required, 
as we have pointed out, the jury to find that the 
place of work was unsafe because the flooring 
was old and rough, and that defendant furnished 
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the place of work in such a condition, and that 
by doing so defendant was negligent. Thus the 
jury had to find defendant knew of such condition 
for some time before it could return a verdict for 
plaintiff under the instruction. We find no error 
in this instruction under the particular circum-
stances of this case." 
One of the cases relied upon by defendant in its 
brief is Hatfield '1/. Thompson, 252 S.\Y. 2d 534, (~[iE­
souri 1952) where the Supreme Court discussed the 
l\fessing, Kamer and Schonlau cases. In the Hatfield 
case the plaintiff, a conductor, while attempting to board 
a moving train, allegedly slipped in a hole in defendant'~ 
right of way. The most hotly disputed issue of the case 
had to do with whether the r.ailroad company had knowl-
edge of the hole in the right of way. The trial court's 
instructions allowed the jury to find from the mere 
existence of the hole that the defendant was negligent 
without requiring a finding of prior knowledge of the 
existence of the hole by the railroad company. The 
Missouri Supreme Court held that this was error anrl 
pointed out the distinction between the situation existing 
in the Hatfield case and that in the Schonlau ca8e. Tlw 
court stated : 
"It is the law that 'vhere the defect is of 
such a nature that the finding of its existence 
carries with it the clear inference of knowledge 
of defendant of its prior existence, an instruc-
tion omitting such a finding cannot be said to 
be prejudicially erroneous. Schonlau Y. Tenninal 
R. Ass'n. of St. Louis, 357 ~fo. 1108, 1116-111 S. 
212 S.W. 2d --l-:20, 4:2-t. --l-:25. But, as stated, no 
such inference arises in this case. The hole here 
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involved could e.asily and quickly be made by 
any number of agencies other than that of de-
fendant's workmen." 
The facts of the case at bar bring it within the 
Schonlau rather than the Hatfield case. The jury was 
required to find in the Schonlau case that the flooring 
was old .and rough. In the case at bar the break in the 
pipe was old and rusted and consequently discoverable 
by inspection according to the undisputed evidence. On 
the other hand, in the Hatfield case the length of time 
the hole in the right of way had existed and whether the 
defendant could have acquired prior knowledge of its 
existence were hotly disputed and .an instruction on 
prior knowledge was held by the court to be necessary 
to prevent misunderstanding by the jury. In the case 
at bar the facts pertaining to knowledge being undis-
puted, the only issue was whether the jury should draw 
an inference of negligence. Inferences from uncontro-
verted, as well as controverted facts, are questions for 
the jury. See Ellis 1:. TTnion Pacific R.R. Co., 329 U.S. 
649, 67 S. Ct. 598, 91 L. Ed. 572. 
Other ca.ses support plaintiff's position. Blew v. 
Atchinson T. & S.F. Ry. Co., (:Mo. 1951) 245 S.W. :Zd 
31, Rotlnrell v. Pennsyl V(( nia R. Co., 87 F. Supp. 706 
(1950). Williams 1'. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 190 F. 
2d 744. Pritt v. West Virgi11ia Y. R. Co. (W.Va.) 51 
S.E. 2d 1 05, 6 A. L. R. 2d 562. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS SUBMISSION OF IN-
STRUCTION NO. 7 TO THE JURY. 
~------------------------
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Instruction No. 7 authorizes the jury to find that 
it was the custmn and practice of defendant eornpany 
to shut off the steam at the intermediate valve and to 
further find that failure of defendant to shut off the 
intermediate valve was negligence which proximately 
caused injuries to plaintiff. Defendant makes the follow-
ing statement in his brief at page 23: 
"There was no evidence offered or rec-eived 
at the trial proving or tending to prove that it 
was the custom and practice or duty of the de-
fendant company, under the circumstanc-es, to 
shut off the steam at the intermediate valve 
through an employee other than plaintiff.'~ 
The foregoing statement is incorrect. Griffiths te~ti­
fied as follows: 
"Q. And do vou have a custom and rule which 
requires that steamfitters turn the stean1 off 
at a major valve like that prior to the time 
that they work on a piece of equipment like 
this where it's going to be shut do-w-n for 
some time~ 
A. Well, that work of turning the steam i11 
your steamfitting and so on is generall~T con-
sidered pipefitter's work. 
Q. And is it usual for the pipefitters to turn 
the stean1 off or have it turned off when work 
like this is done 1 
A. Yes." (R. 93) 
Aberton testified to the same effect. 
"A. The practice is to turn off the inter1nediate 
valve before you make any repairs on the 
stuffing box at these hmnmers." (R. 138) 
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Schenk also testified to the S'aine effect. 
"A. I notify the machinist to make a rep;air, and 
then the practice is, when the machinist goes 
out there, when he is free to go out there 
and do the job, he notifies me about it, and 
I get a pipefitter to prepare the work. We 
have an intermediate valve which is shut 
off - necessary to shut this off, so the man 
can work with security on the job. That is 
considered a pipefitter's job, and we - I 
instruct the pipefitter to shut that valve off.'' 
(R. 150). 
In this connection we again call attention to the fact 
that Schenk was present when the work conunenced and 
made no effort to have a pipefitter turn off the inter-
mediate valve. He .should have known the intermediate 
valve was not turned off because it would only be turned 
off pursuant to his orders. 
Heywood was unaware of the existence of the inter-
mediate valve (R. 51). 
ft is true Crowton \Vas of the opinion that the valve 
next to the hammer would be the proper one to shut 
off in umking a repair such as was being 1nade by plain-
tiff. This did not eliminate the testimony concerning 
the <·ustmn and practice of turning off the intermediate 
valve when "·ork such as that being done by plaintiff 
was anticipated. 
Plaintiff is not bound by each and Pvery item of 
testinwny by each and every witness called on his behalf. 
~ -------------
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In Schlatter v. McCarthy (1948) 113 Utah 543, 196 
P. (2) 968, this court stated: 
"But a party is not bound by every state-
ment that his witness makes, ,and he may, by 
testimony of other witne_sses and in argument to 
the jury, show that the facts were different from 
those testified to by the witness. This is per-
mitted, not for the purpose of impeaching the 
witness (although it may have that incidental 
effect), but for establishing the true facts. It 
would be a monstrous rule that would bind a party 
to every statement of every witness produced by 
him." 
The cases cited by defendant are not in point in 
view of the fact plaintiff did not testify that no custom 
and practice of turning off the intermediate valve 
existed, but only that he was unaware of the existence 
of the valve. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS SUBMISSION OF IN-
STRUCTION NO. 8 TO THE JURY. 
The evidence supporting subn1is_sion of Instruction 
No. 8 is briefly this. A stemn le.ak was discovered on 
the n1orning of the occurrence by Griffiths (R. 87). 
Griffiths prompt}~~ notified foren1an Schenk of the leak 
(R. 87). Schenk inspected the single arch hannner so he 
could "notify the n1an about going out and Inaking re-
pairs.'' He testified: 
"Q. That was so ~?on could detennine whether or 
not to send a pipefitter out, or just a 
machinist, isn't that right~ 
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A. In a way, yes." (R. 154). 
The leak could have been caused either by a crack 
in the piping itself or by loose packing. The only way 
to determine which of the.se causes actually existed 
was to dismantle the pipe. This was a pipefitter's and 
not a machinists job. Schenk decided not to have the 
pipefitter dismantle the pipe, but to take a chance and 
replace the packing in the hopes that the packing was 
the cause of the leak. This was Schenk's decision. Even 
after Heywood had commenced the work of replacing 
the packing, Schenk returned to the hammer and gave 
him a piece of packing which turned out to be the wrong 
type. At that time Schenk did not suggest that the pipe 
be removed .and inspected. He was content to have Hey-
wood go ahead with the replace1nent of the packing. 
Under these circumstances, it became a jury question 
whether the railroad should have made the inspection 
which would have revealed the cause of the leak. The 
following authorities support the giving of Instruction 
Xo. 7: 
Solonwn R. Co. v. Jones, 30 Kan. 601, 2 P. 657; In 
re California Nav. & Imp. Co., 110 Fed. 670; Port of 
.V PW York 8teredoring Corporation v. Castagna, 280 Fed. 
618; Allen v. Union Pacific R. Co., 7 Ptah 239, 26 P. 
:297; Brown v. Sharphottse Contracting Co., 159 Cal. 89, 
112 P. 874; Corn Products Refining Co. n. I(ing, 168 
Fed. 892; Vew Deemer Mfg. Co. v. ~wells, 296 Fed. 687. 
It is interesting to note that defendant cites no 
authorities to support its claim that Instruction No. 8 
should not have been submitted to the jury. 
·~--------------------------
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDI·CIAL 
ERROR BY REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S RE-
QUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NO. 1, 8 AND 11. 
In Point IY of its brief, defendant expresses di~­
satisfaction with the court's instructions No. 9 and 10 
on the issue of contributory negligence. Defendant ];.: 
not in a position to complain about these instruction~ 
since it requested they be given and took no exception 
to them. 
Defendant clai1ns its requested instructions X o. J, I 
8 and 11 should have been given. Before considering 
said requests separately we desire to answer some of the 
general contentions n1ade by defendant in its hodge 
podge point. 
In criticizing the Court's instructions X o. 9 and 
10, defendant states at page 37 of its brief: 
"Neither of said instructions charges the jury 
on the theory that plaintiff had a duty to request 
and arrange for a pipefitter to inspect the pipe 
and to ren1ove the pipe." 
It is our position that plaintiff was under no duty 
to overrule fore1nan Schenk's decision not to haYe a 
pipefitter renwve and inspect the pipe. It is our further 
position that nevertheless Instruction K o. 10 includes 
the proposition contended for by defendant. Instruction 
No. 10 reads in part as follows: 
"If yon find fr01n n preponderance of the 
evidence that the plaintiff in perfonuing the 
duties of his en1ploy:Inent, and in the exercise of 
due care for his own safety, should hare dis-
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covered the defect in the steam pipe and failed 
so to do, then you may find that the pJaintiff was 
negligent, etc." 
Plaintiff couldn't re1nove the pipe because this was 
not a 1nachinist's job. The only way he could have dis-
covered the defect was to request that a pipefitter re-
move the pipe for an inspection. The jury w.as told by 
Instruction No. 10 that they could find plaintiff guilty 
of contributory negligence for his failure to make such 
a request. It is a well known principle of law that if 
a proposition contained in a requested instruction is 
adequately instructed upon by the court in another in-
struction, there is no error in refusal to give such a 
request. See Joice v.ll/fissmtri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. (Mis-
~onri 1945) 189 S.W. 2d 568, 161 ALR 383. 
Defendant's requested Instruction No. 1 requires 
only a finding that a safe and a dangerous way of per-
forming the work exi.sted and were equally open to the 
plaintiff and that he selected the unsafe way, as a basis 
for negligence on his part as a matter of law. Whether 
plaintiff was aware of the safe w.ay of performing the 
work becomes immaterial under the instruction. No re-
quirement that plaintiff did not act as a reasonably pru-
(lent person under the eirenmstanee~ is imposed by the in-
stnwtion. If he selected a dangerous way and a safe 
way was open to him, then he is negligent. The jury 
is further authorized to find that such negligence wi.s 
the sole proximate cause of his injury. 
A party 111a~: sele(•t a dangerous way as distin .. 
guished from a safe way of doing work hut, neverthe-
.. ._ -------------
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less, have acted as a reasonably prudent person under 
the circumstances. Ka~m~ans v. White Star Gas & Oil 
Co., 92 Utah 24, 32, 63 P. 2d 231; Moore v. Miles, 108 
Utah 167, 158 P. 2d 676. 
A moment's consideration will reveal that for a 
workman to choose a less safe course of doing his work 
cannot be contributory negligence as a matter of law. 
The fundamental rule of contributory negligence is that 
a person must use the care that a reasonably prudent 
person would use in looking out for his own safet}T· There 
are, of course, situations in which the conduct of an 
injured person 1nay be such that all reasonable 1nind~ 
would agree that he did not u_se such care. In that event, ~ 
he would be guilty of contributory negligence as a matter 1 
of law. However, the choosing of a way less safe than 
another does not require a finding of contributory negli-
gence for the simple reason that a reasonably prudent 
person may have chosen a less safe way. This is par-
ticularly true under the facts of the case at bar where 
plaintiff te_stified that he was unaware of the existence 
of the internwdiate Yalve. This proposition of law is 
clearly pointed out in BailC'!J 1.'. Prime Trestern Spelter 
('o., 83 l{an. 230, 109 P. 791 (1910): See also Bri11kmeier 
L llfisso~tri Parific Ry. Co., 69 I'"an. 738. 77 P. 58(). 
Futhern10re, defendant's requested Instruction X o. 
1 allowed tlw jury to find that plaintiff's negligence 
in failing to ~eleet the safe way as distinguished from 
the dangerous way. wa~ the sole proxilnate cause of 
his injllr~T· lTnder the farts of the rase at bar this 'Yould 
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have been error. See Tlwmson vs. Boles, 123 F. (2d) 487, 
492 (8 C.CA. 1941). 
The trial court's Instruction ~ o. 9 left it for the 
jm·~, to consider under general standards of reasonable 
care whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent in 
not shutting off the intermediate valve and allowed 
the jury to determine not only that such was negligence 
on the part of plaintiff but that it was the sole proximate 
cause of his injury. This instruction allowed defendant 
full leeway in arguing contributory negligence to the 
jury and, in fact submitted correctly the issue undertaken 
to be submitted by defendant's requested Instruction 
~ o. 1. Intruction No. 9 was and is a correct statement of 
the lav{ and eliminates the erroneous propositions hereto-
fore pointed out that are present in defendant's requested 
Instruction ~ o. 1. 
Likewise defendant's requested Instruction No. 3 
1s erroneous. In the first paragraph of the instruction 
it is stated categorically that Heywood had the duty of 
exercising reasonable care "in arranging for the shut-off 
of the 1naster steam valve in the shop." Plaintiff testi-
fied that he wasn't aware of the existence of such a 
steam valve in the shop. He was entitled to belief by 
the jury on this issue. If he didn't know of the existence 
of the stemn valve, certainly he was under no legal 
duty to arrange to have it shut off. Yet, requested In-
struction ~ o. 8 imposed such a duty upon him as a 
matter of law. Clearly the instruction would have been 
erroneous if given. 
·~ -------------------------
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Defendant's requested Instruction No. 11 is likewise 
erroneous. Said instruction reads in part ". . . if you 
find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plain-
tiff negligently failed to detect a rusted and corroded 
condition in the steam pipe, etc. . . . " Said instruction 
declares as a matter of law that plaintiff had the duty 
of endeavoring to detect the rusted and corroded con-
dition of the steam pipe and then goes on to submit 
to the jury the que.stion of whether plaintiff was negli-
gent in performance of said duty. Under the evidence 
most favorable to plaintiff, the jury could find that 
plaintiff had no duty of inspecting the pipe: that in-
structions concerning dismantling of the pipe would have 
to come fr01n the foren1an, and the work of dismantling 
the pipe would have to be done by a pipefitter rather 
than by plaintiff. This instruction would clearly have 
been error. 
As heretofore pointed out the issue was in fact 
submitted to the jury by Instruction K o. 10 '\vhich al-
lowed the jury to find that in the exercise of ordinary 
care plaintiff should have discovered the defect in tlw 
pipe. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL ·COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR BY REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S RE-
QUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 6. 
The issue of safe place to work was adequately 
and correctly instructed upon in the eourfs Instruction 
No. 6 and thP other instructions e1nuner.ated and dis-
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cussed in this hrief under Point I. 
It is our position that defendant'.s requested instruc-
tion ~ o. 6 would have contributed nothing substantial to 
the court's instructions. This can best be pointed out by 
considering each of the elernents required by the request. 
The first element requires a finding that defendant 
knew or should have known of .an unsafe condition or de-
fective equipment. As pointed out by us in Point I, the 
extent and nature of the knowledge po.ssessed by defen-
dant railroad company was not an issue in the case. The 
railroad cmnpany knew of the leak, was aware of the f.act 
that an external inspection would not reveal the cause 
of the leak and that in order to discover whether loose 
packing or a bre.ak in the pipe was causing the leak, the 
pjpe would have to be dismantled. It is undisputed that 
removal and inspertion of the pipe would have revealed 
the eause of the leak. The facts being undisputed the 
question to he resolved by the jury was whether in 
,·iew of such facts the railroad company by directing 
plaintiff to rerno·ve and replaee the packing, exer-
eised ordinary eare in furnishing hiln with a reason-
ah1y safe place in which to work. Defendant's requested 
instruction X o. 6 would have subrnitted to the jury issues 
that were not in dispute. Consequently, the manner 
adopted hy the trial court in subrnitting the issue of safe 
place to vYork to the jury was less apt to be misunder-
stood by the jury than would have been defendant's re-
(lUested instruction No. 6. We have heretofore distin-
t,ruished the Horton, Dixon, Hatfield, Burks and Stevens 
cases. Those cases contained mandatory instructions re-
·-"'CS.'IIo. ____________ ..... 
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moving from the jury the issue of whether defendant had 
exerci;:;ed reasonable care in furnishing a reasonably safe 
place to work. 
The second element in defendant's requested instruc-
tion No. 6 that the railroad before being liable should in 
the exercise of reasonable care have known that the un-
safe condition gave rise to an unreasonable risk of harm, 
is included in instruction No. 6 where the Court requires 
as a condition to recovery that "Defendant failed to exer-
cise reasonable care to make .said place reasonably safe 
for the performance of such duties in that the position of 
the plaintiff in connection with his duties and the opera-
tion of appliances used in the performance of his duties, 
were such that the plaintiff was not perfonning his duties 
in a place of reasonable safety, etc." If the jury found, as 
it mu.st, in order to allow recovery for plaintiff, that he 
was not in a position of reasonable safety, then of course, 
the jury was finding that he was subjected to an unrea-
sonable risk of harm. These are n1erely hYo different 
w.ays of stating the same thing. 
The third sub-section of requested instruction X o. 6 
requires that the railroad had a "sufficient period of tune 
within which to correct said unsafe condition, etc ... lTnder 
the undisputed facts of the case the leak was discovered 
and repoded to ~ehenk. He it was who decided whether 
to have a Inachini~t replace the packing or a pipefitter 
renwve and in~pt>et the piping. The ti1ne ele1nent was not 
an issue. The i~~lH' had to do with the decision n1ade by 
S<·I1Pnk at the time he inspected the leak. The railroad 
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had sufficient time to correct the unsafe condition simply 
by sending a pipefitter to remove the pipe and inspect it. 
The r.ailroad didn't do this. The length of time had by 
the railroad within which to correct the unsafe condition 
was not a disputed issue. Also to permit recovery only 
in the event defendant did not have time to fix the pipe 
would eliminate recovery for negligence in permitting 
plaintiff to work there after defendant had discovered the 
dangerous condition. It should not only fix the condition 
but until fixed should take steps to protect persons from 
the danger. 
The fourth requirement of the requested instruction 
that the unsafe condition was .a proximate cause of plain-
tiff's injuries, of course, was submitted correctly in the 
court's Instruction No. 6. 
The trial court did not commit error in refusing to 
give said instruction. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL ·COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR BY REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S RE-
QUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 2. 
Defendant's requested Instruction No. 2 is set forth 
as follows for the convenience of the Court: 
"You .are instructed that a Railroad Company 
is not required to adopt extraordinary or unrea-
sonable tests or examinations to discover defects 
in machinery, but fulfills its duty if it adopts such 
tests and examination procedure as are ordinarily 
used by prudently conducted Railroads under like 
ci reu1nstances. '' 
-·...-...'l!.. ,------------1111111 
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Plaintiff Inade no contention that the railroad COlll-
pany was required to adopt extraordinary or unreason-
able tests or examinations to discover defects in mach-
inery. Under Moore v. Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Railroad Company, 4 Utah 2d 255, 292 P. 2d 849 (1956) 
extraneous issues not raised by the pleadings or by the 
parties should not be submitted to the jury. See also 
Pollard v. Gammon ( Ua. 1940), 63 Ga. App. 852, 1~ S.E. 
2d 624. 
The last portion of requested instruction X o. 2, in 
our opinion is erroneous where it states: "But fulfills its 
duty if it adopts such tests and examination procedure a~ 
are ordinarily u.sed by prudently conducted Railroads 
under like circumstances." The issue is not what is ordin-
arily done by prudently conducted railroads, because pru-
dently conducted railroads n1ight ordinarily perform 
work in a negligent manner under certain circumstances. 
The test is that of ordinary care under the circun1stances 
.and the tribunal to detern1ine this issue is the jury. As 
was said by l\[r. Justice Hohnes in T.e.ras and Pacific 
Railu·ay Co. r. Bel1ymer, 189 r.~. 468, 23 ~. Ct. 62~. 
47 LEd 905: 
"What usually is done Inay be evidence of 
what ought to be done, but what ought to be done, 
is fixed by a standard of re.asonable prudence, 
whether it usually is co1nplied with or not. TVa-
bash R. Co. L illcDaniels. 107 r. s. -!5-t. 27 L. Ed 
605, 2 Supp. Ct. Rep 932. ·· 
See 68 ALR 1400, 1-!-!5, Annotation entitled .. Custom 
as a Standard of Care, .. "·here it is said: 
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·• Where the safety of en1ployees i.s dependent 
npon the employer Inaking reasonable tests or in-
spections of equipment, the quite general rule is 
that general practice is not a 1neasure of the c.are 
required." 
~ee also International & G.Y.B. Co., v. Hawes (1899; 
Tex Civ. App) 54 S.W. 325; Jlfidland Valley R. Co. r. 
Bell (1917) 155 C.C.A. 391, 242 Fed. 803 (Certiorari de-
nie<l in (1917) :245 U.S. 653, 62 L. Ed. :132, 38 S. Ct. 1:2). 
Another defect in the requested instruction i.s that 
no evidence was introduced by defendant as to the tests 
and procedures ordinarily used by prudently conducted 
railroads under like circumstances. Therefore it goes 
without saying that an instruction on the subject would 
have been error. 
POINT VII 
THE ISSUES OF NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE WERE FOR THE JURY: THE TRIAL COURT 
CORRECTLY AND JUSTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
A brief review of the facts nwst favorable to plain-
tiff indicate that this was a case peeuliarly for the jury. 
The evidence revealed that a steam leak had developed 
in a stuffing box. The leak was caused either by loose 
packing or by a crack or break in the pipe within the 
stuffing box .. \ visual inspection would not reveal which 
of the two possible cau.ses existed. If the packing within 
the box was to he replaced a machinist would be assigned 
to perforrn the work. If the pipe w.as to he removed and 
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inspected, a pipefitter would be given the assignment. 
Foreman Schenk made a visual inspection and decided 
that he would take a chance and have Heywood replace 
the packing. This failure to remove the pipe .and make 
an inspection which would have revealed the exact cause 
of the leak created the situation out of which liability on 
the part of defendant arises. Clearly there was an evi-
dentiary basis for a finding that no proper and adequate 
inspection was made by defendant prior to assigning 
plaintiff the task of replacing the packing. Likewise, a 
jury question was presented as to whether the railroad 
was negligent through its foreman Schenk in not sending 
.a pipefitter to turn off the intermediate valve before re-
quiring plaintiff to replace the packing. Schenk knew 
when plaintiff was going to perform this 'vork. He was 
at the steam hammer at the commencement of the work. 
He knew the situation with respect to the presence or ab-
sence of steam in the line, or so a jury could find, and he 
did not take proper steps to turn the steam out of the line 
at the intermediate valve. A jury question was like"\\ise 
presented with respect to whether or not defendant had 
exercised reasonable care in providing plaintiff "ith a 
rea.sonably safe place to work. Plaintiff was required to 
1nount a ladder approxi1nately ten feet in the air and to 
work at the stuffing box. The jury could well have found 
that plaintiff was .also required to turn the valve at the 
stuffing box back on to test the adequacy of the stuffing 
before moving fr01n the ladder. Not only the physical 
factors present n1ust be considered in detennining 
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whether a reasonably safe place to work has been pro-
vided for plaintiff, but the conduct of his fellow em-
ployees .and of his supervisors. 
Perhaps the leading case under the Federal Employ-
ers' Liability Act on the matter of safe place to work is 
Bailey ~ 1 • Central Vermont Ry. Inc., 319 U. S. 350, 63 S. 
Ct. 1062, 87 L. Ed. 1444, where Mr. Justice Douglas, 
speaking for the court stated: 
"The nature of the task which Bailey under-
took, the hazards which it entailed, the effort 
which it required, the kind of footing he had, the 
space in which he could stand, the absence of a 
guard rail, the height of the bridge above the 
ground, the fact that the car could have been 
opened or unloaded near the bridge on level 
ground-all these were facts .and circumstances 
for the jury to weigh and appraise in determining 
whether respondent in furnishing Bailey with that 
particular place in which to perform the task was 
negligent. The debatable quality of that issue, the 
f.act that fair-minded men might reach different 
conclusions, emphasize the appropriateness of 
leaving the question to the jury. The jury is the 
tribunal under our legal system to decide that 
type of is.sue (Tiller v. Atlantic Coast LineR. Co., 
supra) as well as issues involving controverted 
evidence. Jones v. East Tennessee, V. G. R. Co., 
128 C. S. 443, 445, 9 S. Ct. 118, 32 L. Ed. 4 78 ; 
Washington & G. R. Co. v. McDade, 135 U.S. 554, 
572, 10 S. Ct. 1044, 1049, 34 L. Ed. 235. To with-
draw such .a question fron1 the jury is to usurp its 
functions. 
See also Wilkerson v. Jl ce a r ll1 y, 336 P. S. 53, 69 S. 
c~t. -±13, 93 L. Ed. 497. 
"~~,------------------------
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Defendant state·s at page 44 of its brief: 
"The failure to correct the condition was neg-
ligence on the part of plaintiff. Plaintiff was in 
the best possible position to ascertain the trouble 
and appreciate the danger. Plaintiff took it upon 
himself to turn the steam without having cor-
rected or repaired the defect." 
The issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence in 
the foregoing regard was properly left to the jury under 
Instructions K o. 9 and 10 and ·was resolved against defen-
dant. Not content, counsel for defendant now undertakes 
a reargument of the facts. vYe detect once again an ef-
fort to revive the doctrine of assumption of risk abolished 
by the 1939 amendment . A late denunciation of this pro-
cedure is found in Thomas 1/. Union Railway Company, 
(6th circuit 1954) 216 F 2d 18. 
See also Atlantic Coast LineR. Co. r. Burkett, (5th 
circuit 1951) 192 F 2d 941. 
We submit that the issues of negligence and contri-
butory negligence were peculiarly for the jury under the 
facts of this case and that the trial court correctly and 
justly denied defendanfs nwtion for .a directed verdict. 
CONCLU~IOX 
In conclusion we call attention to the following sig-
nificant statmnent in Southern Pacific Company r. Guth-
rie (9th circuit 1949) 180 F. 2d 295: 
"Perhaps son1e of the abstract propositions 
of the defendant's counsel contained in the in-
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:structions asked for, based on the facts a.ssumed 
herein, if such f.acts were conceded, or found in a 
special verdict, would be technically correct. But 
a judge is not bound to charge upon assumed facts 
in the ipsissima verba of counsel, nor to give cate-
gorical answers to a juridical catechism based on 
such assumption. Such .a course would often mis-
lead the jury instead of enlightening them, and is 
calculated rather to involve the case in the meshes 
of technicality, than to promote the ends of law 
and justice. It belongs to the judicial office to 
exercise discretion as to the style and form in 
which to expound the law .and comment upon the 
facts. If a judge states that law incorrectly, or 
refuses to state it at all, on a point material to the 
issue, the party aggrieved will be entitled to a 
new trial. But when he explains the whole law 
applicable to the case in hand, as we think was 
done in this case, he cannot be called upon to ex-
pres.s it in the categorical form based upon as-
suined facts, which counsel choose to present to 
hun." 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the issues were 
properly and adequately submitted to the jury by the 
trial court's instructions and that the jur:v's verdict 
should be affinned. 
Respectfully sub1nitted, 
RAWLINGS, \V.ALLAl 1 1j~' 
ROBJ1~RTS & BLACK: 
By WAYNE L. BLACK, 
Co'ltnsel for Respondent 
-~~,-------------------------
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Recerved ---·---------···-·· copres of the wrthm Btt~l';~ 
l 
Respondent this ---------------~---- day of~ December, ~~~:~ 
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